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Simple Adaptive Strategies

Author: Sergiu Hart
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814401595
Size: 39.85 MB
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This volume collects almost two decades of joint work of Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell on game dynamics and equilibria. The starting point was the introduction of the adaptive strategy called regret-matching, which on the one hand is simple and natural, and on the other is shown to lead to correlated equilibria. This initial finding — boundedly rational behavior that yields fully rational outcomes in the long run — generated a large body of work on the dynamics of simple adaptive strategies. In particular, a natural condition on dynamics was identified: uncoupledness, whereby decision-makers do not know each other's payoffs and utilities (so, while chosen actions may be observable, the motivations are not). This condition turns out to severely limit the equilibria that can be reached. Interestingly, there are connections to the behavioral and neurobiological sciences and also to computer science and engineering (e.g., via notions of “regret”). Simple Adaptive Strategies is self-contained and unified in its presentation. Together with the formal treatment of concepts, theorems, and proofs, significant space is devoted to informal explanations and illuminating examples. It may be used for advanced graduate courses — in game theory, economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering — and for further research. Contents:Correlated Equilibria:Existence of Correlated Equilibria (Sergiu Hart and David Schmeidler)Regret Matching:A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)A General Class of Adaptive Strategies (Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)A Reinforcement Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)Regret-Based Continuous-Time Dynamics (Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)General Procedures Leading to Correlated Equilibria (Amotz Cahn)Uncoupled Dynamics:Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium (Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium (Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria (Yakov Babichenko)How Long to Equilibrium? The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled Equilibrium Procedures (Sergiu Hart and Yishay Mansour)Dynamics and Equilibria:Adaptive Heuristics (Sergiu Hart)Nash Equilibrium and Dynamics (Sergiu Hart) Readership: Graduate students and researchers in game theory, economic theory, econometrics, computer science and engineering. Keywords:Game Theory;Dynamics;Equilibrium;Nash Equilibrium;Correlated Equilibrium;Adaptive Dynamics;Simple Strategies;Regret-Based Strategies;Uncoupled Dynamics;Bounded RationalityKey Features:Prominent authors (two world-leading game theorists)Significant cutting-edge body of researchNovel ideas and insights that are useful and applicable in many areasReviews: "A fundamental issue with any concept of equilibrium, including Nash and correlated equilibria, is to define the process by which equilibrium is attained. The work of Professors Hart and Mas-Colell has been the deepest in this area, especially in defining conditions (‘uncoupled dynamics’) which reflect naturally the information available in real economic interactions. Their body of results is essential to study of these fundamental problems."; Kenneth J Arrow Stanford University, USA "In social as well as physical systems, equilibrium is of fundamental importance. Reaching equilibrium is at least as important as being there. In the last quarter century, research that investigates how social or game-theoretic equilibrium is reached has been spearheaded bySergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell. The most outstanding works in this area are gathered in the book before us — a must for anyone interested in this dynamic area of emerging economic research." Robert J Aumann Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel "The question of learning and convergence to equilibrium is of critical importance to the foundations and applications of game theory. But after half a century of research there are no universally accepted answers: different assumptions about players' information and learning dynamics lead to different conclusions. The Hart and Mas-Colell book describes fascinating directions of research on this subject developed by two distinguished authors and their collaborators over the last dozen years." Ehud Kalai Northwestern University, USA "In this collection two leading game theorists show that various forms of equilibrium can be learned by simple and natural learning strategies that put minimal demands on the players' knowledge and level of rationality. It represents a major contribution to one of the most important topics in modern game theory."; Peyton Young Oxford University, UK

Algorithmic Game Theory

Author: Ron Lavi
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3662448033
Size: 80.35 MB
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This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2014, held in Haifa, Israel, in October 2014. The 24 full papers and 5 short papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 65 submissions. They cover various important aspects of algorithmic game theory, such as matching theory, game dynamics, games of coordination, networks and social choice, markets and auctions, price of anarchy, computational aspects of games, mechanism design and auctions.

Econophysics Of The Kolkata Restaurant Problem And Related Games

Author: Bikas K. Chakrabarti
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319613529
Size: 23.81 MB
Format: PDF, Docs
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This book provides the first comprehensive introduction to multi-agent, multi-choice repetitive games, such as the Kolkata Restaurant Problem and the Minority Game. It explains how the tangible formulations of these games, using stochastic strategies developed by statistical physicists employing both classical and quantum physics, have led to very efficient solutions to the problems posed. Further, it includes sufficient introductory notes on information-processing strategies employing both classical statistical physics and quantum mechanics. Games of this nature, in which agents are presented with choices, from among which their goal is to make the minority choice, offer effective means of modeling herd behavior and market dynamics and are highly relevant to assessing systemic risk. Accordingly, this book will be of interest to economists, physicists, and computer scientists alike.

The Language Of Game Theory

Author: Adam Brandenburger
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 981451344X
Size: 28.41 MB
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This volume contains eight papers written by Adam Brandenburger and his co-authors over a period of 25 years. These papers are part of a program to reconstruct game theory in order to make how players reason about a game a central feature of the theory. The program OCo now called epistemic game theory OCo extends the classical definition of a game model to include not only the game matrix or game tree, but also a description of how the players reason about one another (including their reasoning about other players' reasoning). With this richer mathematical framework, it becomes possible to determine the implications of how players reason for how a game is played. Epistemic game theory includes traditional equilibrium-based theory as a special case, but allows for a wide range of non-equilibrium behavior. Sample Chapter(s). Foreword (39 KB). Introduction (132 KB). Chapter 1: An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games (299 KB). Contents: An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games (Adam Brandenburger and H Jerome Keisler); Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge (Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel); Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria (Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel); Intrinsic Correlation in Games (Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg); Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium (Robert Aumann and Adam Brandenburger); Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty (Lawrence Blume, Adam Brandenburger, and Eddie Dekel); Admissibility in Games (Adam Brandenburger, Amanda Friedenberg and H Jerome Keisler); Self-Admissible Sets (Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg). Readership: Graduate students and researchers in the fields of game theory, theoretical computer science, mathematical logic and social neuroscience."

The Future Of Futures

Author: Elena Esposito
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1849809119
Size: 63.68 MB
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'Within the cacophony of voices trying to explain the recent financial crisis, Elena Esposito's voice sounds clear and deep. Steering away from simplistic condemnations and equally simplistic prescriptions for betterment, she connects the very invention of derivatives to that eternal human hope – of controlling the future. While the task is impossible, the attempts never stop, and the very process of attempting it brings some consolation. And while derivatives can be seen, claim sociologists of finance, as performative, that is shaping the future they promise to control, even this is far from certain. Esposito's fascinating and beautiful work is an important contribution to the sociology of finance, a subdiscipline of sociology that took on itself an extremely important task of explaining how the finance markets really work.'– Barbara Czarniawska, University of Gothenburg, Sweden'This is a brilliant and timely book that shows how financing is centrally implicated in the very unpredictability and uncertainty it purports to master. With the incisiveness characteristic of her style and writing, Esposito reads economics in innovative ways that disclose the hidden premises by which financial instruments trade and consume the prospects of the future.' – Jannis Kallinikos, London School of Economics, UK'Elena Esposito's analysis of financial markets and of their recent decline is radically different from the analyses which can be found in economic journals or books. Financial operations are reduced to their basic dimensions: time and money. Under this perspective, what is sold on financial markets is the possibility for the creation of commitments in the course of time, the possibility for the combination of these commitments with one another, and the identification of chances for the achievement of profit opportunities through the creation of specific combinations. The author argues that the recent crisis of the financial system was caused by oversimplified visions of the future and of risk leading to the consequence that options were not available in the present because all possibilities had been used up by the future. This oversimplified vision of the future imploded, and trust with it. The state tried to reconstruct options for the future in order to open up new possibilities and chances for learning. The author does not deliver recipes on how to prevent severe crises of the financial system in the future. Yet, her concept facilitates understanding of how financial futures are opened up or closed and thus provides insights into basic principles on whose basis future opportunities can be kept open and trust can be maintained. Innovative reforms of the financial system can only develop on the basis of unconventional analyses. Elena Esposito's book contains an analysis of this kind.'– Alfred Kieser, Mannheim University, Germany'Elena Esposito's book is a fundamental analysis of time in economics. With economic rigour underpinned by sociological reasoning, she explains the futures market more clearly than is possible with economic analysis alone. Economic concepts are considered in terms of time – actors deal in the present with future risks by transferring these risks to the present situation. As a result, we get more options and more risks at the same time: at present. No equilibrium will balance these trades because of the asymmetry of time: our actual decisions deal with our imagination of the future, that is, with the future of the present, but the results will be realized in the presence of the future – different modalities of time. The book is a sound reflection on modelling time in economic theory, a "must" for economists.'– Birger P. Priddat, Witten/Herdecke University, Germany'The Future of Futures is an original and intellectually provocative book which forces the reader to think. Esposito's essay fulfils two rather different functions. On the one hand, it brings new and persuasive arguments to bear against the erroneous thesis that the present financial crisis is merely due to human mistakes and to some specific government failures. On the other hand, the book suggests that only by reconsidering the role of time in the economy is it possible to make full sense of the crisis and to re-orient in a desired direction the future movements of money. It is a well-known fact that traditional economics has always adhered to a spatial conception of time, according to which time, like space, is perfectly reversible. Whence its inability both to understand how economies develop and to prescribe adequate policies. The author's proposal is to move steps ahead in the direction of an analysis of an economy in time, where both historical time and time as duration can find a place. Esposito's well-written, jargon-free book will capture the attention of anyone seriously interested in the future of our market systems.'– Stefano Zamagni, University of Bologna and Johns Hopkins University, Bologna Center, Italy This book reconstructs the dynamics of economics, beginning explicitly with the role and the relevance of time: money uses the future in order to generate present wealth. Financial markets sell and buy risk, thereby binding the future. Elena Esposito explains that complex risk management techniques of structured finance produce new and uncontrolled risks because they use a simplified idea of the future, failing to account for how the future reacts to attempts at controlling it. During the recent financial crisis, the future had already been used (through securitizations, derivatives and other tools) to the extent that we had many futures, but no open future available.

The Theory Of General Economic Equilibrium

Author: Andreu Mas-Colell
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521388702
Size: 27.70 MB
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This book brings together the author's pioneering work, written over the last twenty years, on the use of differential methods in general equilibrium theory.

Partially Observed Markov Decision Processes

Author: Vikram Krishnamurthy
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1316594785
Size: 58.69 MB
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Covering formulation, algorithms, and structural results, and linking theory to real-world applications in controlled sensing (including social learning, adaptive radars and sequential detection), this book focuses on the conceptual foundations of partially observed Markov decision processes (POMDPs). It emphasizes structural results in stochastic dynamic programming, enabling graduate students and researchers in engineering, operations research, and economics to understand the underlying unifying themes without getting weighed down by mathematical technicalities. Bringing together research from across the literature, the book provides an introduction to nonlinear filtering followed by a systematic development of stochastic dynamic programming, lattice programming and reinforcement learning for POMDPs. Questions addressed in the book include: when does a POMDP have a threshold optimal policy? When are myopic policies optimal? How do local and global decision makers interact in adaptive decision making in multi-agent social learning where there is herding and data incest? And how can sophisticated radars and sensors adapt their sensing in real time?

Global Warming And Social Innovation

Author: Andre Faaij
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136564918
Size: 72.90 MB
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Societies need to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by 80 per cent in order to counter the risks of climate change. This study envisions a climate neutral society - one where the output of polluting gases is minimised by social innovations set up in households, by local authorities, through developments in information and communications technologies and dematerialization, and through the shift towards product service systems and emissions trading. The work discusses the possibilities for steering and orchestrating this long-term transition towards a climate-friendly society, mapping paths through current dilemmas in climate policy and exploring the legal issues of making this transition.

Game And Economic Theory

Author: Sergiu Hart
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
ISBN: 9780472106738
Size: 45.68 MB
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Outstanding works showing the application of game theory to economic theory.

The Civilization Of Illiteracy

Author: Mihai Nadin
Publisher: Dresden University Press
ISBN: 3931828387
Size: 38.96 MB
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Phenomena related to the transition from a literacy-dominated civilization to one of various means of expression and communication are at the center of his book. The fall of totalitarian regimes, the current structural difficulties of the European Community, the burden of state bureaucracies, the world-wide effort of re-engineering, and the global economy are part of the bigger picture of a necessary development.